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The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is the proverbial ‘IT guy’ of the global economy. 
While other international economic institutions are highly visible, the BIS mostly remains out of the 
public eye while it weaves a set of rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that establish 
governance structures for both public and private international banks. Without the BIS, information 
sharing among central banks and private financial institutions would be seriously troubled. These 
same institutions would face severe information asymmetries, their creditworthiness assessments 
would be harder to establish, and the effective management of currency crises would be more 
difficult to achieve.  In an environment where average daily turnover in foreign exchange markets is 
now US$1.9 trillion, and the market for investment risk protection alone is worth US$4.5 trillion 
per year, the BIS’s ‘firewalls’ are important to prevent the global financial system from being 
‘spammed’.i  Yet, like our lack of understanding of how the IT guy is (most of the time) able to 
prevent the e-mail system from crashing or our files being wiped, most of us don’t know exactly 
what the BIS does to provide us with the networks that allow global finance to run smoothly (at 
least most of the time).  
Known as the ‘Bank of Central Banks’, the BIS’s original charge in 1930 was to ‘promote 
the co-operation of central banks and to provide additional facilities for international financial 
operations; and to act as a trustee or agent in regard to international financial settlements entrusted 
to it under agreements with the parties concerned’.ii Today, the BIS still provides an institutional 
space for the sharing of information among central bank governors, but it is equally concerned with 
the development of international banking regulation and the collation and dissemination of financial 
data to international financial institutions and private financial market actors.  This Global Monitor 
report provides an overview of the purposes and functions of the BIS and the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision, as well as contemporary problems and debates in international cooperation 
for financial regulation. The report provides a description of the BIS’s institutional characteristics, a 
lightning summary of how the institution has transformed between the 1930s and 1980s, a 
discussion of the formation of ‘Basle Accords’, and the BIS’s recent efforts to build networks for 
monitoring and surveillance at the individual, regional, and international levels. Finally, the report 
reflects on how we may think of this unique institution within the broader context of academic 
debate concerning how international economic institutions can reconfigure actors’ ideas and 
interests.  
 
1. Nuts and Bolts of an International ‘Quango’ 
The BIS was established as an international economic institution that is separate from the fiscal 
obligations of any country, but is also a limited-liability company under Swiss law.iii The BIS may 
therefore be understood as something of an intergovernmental ‘quango’ (quasi-non governmental 
organisation), in that it acts as a service provider of public goods that is underwritten by its 
shareholding central bank members.iv As such, the BIS has the capacity to act on behalf of any 
central bank and as a trustee to facilitate international settlements, but claims against it are limited. 
A further purpose of the BIS’s limited liability status is to affirm that its function is not 
economically redistributive, like the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but to 
provide technical knowledge and banking services. 
 The institution is based in Basle, Switzerland, and is governed by a Board of Directors 
that is chaired by a central bank governor of one of the BIS member states. The original Board of 
Directors was established by the governors of its founding central banks (Belgium, United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, with banking conglomerates from Japan and United States of 
America), with each governor appointing a second representative of the same nationality from 
private industry to affirm the bank’s standing in the capitalist system. The Board can also elect up to 
nine other governors from shareholding banks, although until recently only representatives from the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland were included.v In addition to in-house governance, the BIS 
holds annual general meetings that bring together representatives from central banks and 
international economic institutions. In 2005 more than one hundred central banks attended. 
However, only shareholding member central banks, currently numbering 55, have a right to vote on 
decisions. 
The BIS uses the IMF currency, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), for all transactions.vi As of 
March 2005, the BIS held total assets of SDR 180,486 million (US$275,060 million, of which time 
deposits and advances to banks made up 44 percent, while Treasury bills were 17.3 percent), and 
total liabilities of SDR 170,233 million (US$259,435 million, of which 88 percent are currency 
deposits).  Because the BIS functions as a working bank for central banks, it funds itself through its 
trading activities. Between 1993-2005, it distributed 13 to 31 percent of its net profits through 
dividends to its shareholders, who are central banks that may re-sell their shares to the general 
public while retaining formal ownership.vii
 The BIS currently employs 560 staff from 49 different countries, the vast majority of 
which are located within the internal bureaucracy, and the BIS’s main official arms, the Monetary 
and Economic Department and the Banking Department.viii In addition, the BIS now incorporates a 
Legal Service and a Compliance, Internal Audit, and Risk Control units, reflecting both concerns 
with offering better representation to a larger group of member central banks, and also the growing 
trend among international economic institutions to demonstrate their own transparency. In addition 
to these units, the BIS has its own Financial Stability Institute (FSI) and BIS Representative Offices 
for regional trading operations in Hong Kong and Mexico City. The BIS also acts as a ‘host’ for the 
Financial Stability Forum, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, and the 
International Association of Deposit Insurers.  
 Formally, the Board of Directors sit on Executive, Audit and Consultative committees 
to determine BIS policy directions. However, the BIS is better known for its ‘voluntary policy 
arms’, its committee systems that have no international legal enforcement capacities but which 
shape the character of the global financial order. These committees are, respectively, the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Committee on Payment and Settlements Systems 
(CPSS), the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS, called the Euro-currency Standing 
Committee prior to 1999), and the Markets Committee. The CGFS and the Market Committee 
provide an important monitoring function.ix Among the committees, by the most prominent is the 
BCBS, which produced the ‘Basle Accords’ of 1988 and 2004. Since 1974 the committee has met 
four times a year and comprises representatives from the central bank and key prudential bank 
regulators from the G-10.x More generally, the G-10 is involved in discussions concerning 
economic trends and global financial architecture. 
 
2. Evolution: From Banking Reparations to Repairing Commercial Banks 
The BIS’s original purpose was to assist in overcoming the collective action problem concerning 
German reparations payments.xi During the 1930s the BIS provided emergency financing to 
German and Austrian central banks, but soon shifted focus to coordinating credit networks among 
central bank governors of its member states.  During the 1950s and 1960s the BIS created currency 
swap networks to support the Bretton Woods monetary regime, as well as providing emergency 
currency support to France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. 
 After the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary regime, the BIS responded to new 
developments in the global financial order by providing new regulatory standards for internationally 
active commercial banks. Following commercial bank collapses from currency speculation in 1974, 
the BIS developed the G-10 BCBS, originally established as the Basle Committee on Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Practices. This committee sought to create new standards and 
safeguards for central banks, national prudential regulators, and commercial banks to provide a 
‘normalisation’ of financial markets.xii Of particular concern to the BCBS was the growth of 
syndicated international bank lending, where a number of banks held a part of the loan to diversify 
its default risk and its interest repayments. Such activities led to ‘overlending’ to fragile economies 
(80 percent of recipients were the governments of developing states), while at the same time banks 
were depleting the resources in case of default. The largest US banks, for example, halved their 
‘capital adequacy ratios’ in the late 1970s. The BIS warned that crisis was immanent, a prediction 
that was soon borne out by events. The experience of the Debt Crisis demonstrated the need for a 
more intensive regime on international banking that would require banks to put some capital aside 
for a rainy day.xiii
 
3. The Basle Accords 
The basic idea of the Basle Accords is neatly surmised by Kenneth Rogoff: ‘so bank managers will 
not be able to make one-way bets: that is, risky loans pay off, the bank wins big, and if they do not 
the taxpayer foots the bill for paying off the depositors’.xiv In response to the Debt Crisis there was a 
loose consensus that there should be new regulations to ensure that international banks had capital 
adequacy and that they didn’t fall into ‘moral hazard’ traps. The Bank of England and the US 
Federal Reserve held discussions on how to tackle this problem that established groundwork for a 
new BIS accord, and which satisfied their mutual interest in hobbling Japanese bank 
competitiveness. The European Community also provided their internal regulations on banking 
soundness that arguably forced the US’s hand. Either way, the BCBS provided extensive 
negotiations between G-10 central bank governors and formulated the ‘International Convergence 
of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards’ of 1988.xv This ‘Basle Accord’ (‘Basle I’) required 
international banks to hold eight percent of their capital aside as a safeguard in case of financial 
crises. Half of this ‘regulatory capital’ was to be core capital (equity plus disclosed reserves), and 
the other half ‘supplementary capital’ that passed through a bank’s profit and loss account. The 
safest type of capital to hold was determined by the BIS to be Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) government debt. To meet Basle Accord standards by the 
1992 deadline commercial banks purchase some $150 billion in government securities, of which 
United States Treasury debt was the most liquid .xvi As a consequence, Basle Accord I was a fiscal 
windfall for the US. 
By 1992, 130 countries had adopted, in principle, the Basle Accord standard despite the lack 
of a formal enforcement mechanism from the BIS and BCBS.xvii Within OECD countries 
implementation was rigorous, with international markets providing extra reinforcement by placing 
premiums on the trading operations of non-compliant banks (as occurred to many Japanese banks in 
the mid-1990s).xviii Adoption of the accord, however, reflected both the simplicity of the regulations 
and how far removed financial practices were from its constraints. Even in 1986 the BIS recognized 
that, following the Debt Crisis, syndicated bank lending had died and banks were rapidly going 
through a process of ‘disintermediation’ and off-balance securitization.xix The increasing practice of 
removing assets from a bank’s balance sheet through the use of innovative debt securities made the 
Basle I’s assessment of risks held by banks out of touch with market practices. In 1996 the BCBS 
made amendments to Basle I to incorporate market risks, with banks using their own internal risk 
assessment models.xx US regulators favoured this method of risk assessment, where institutions 
could ‘precommit’ their capital adequacy ratios according to internal assessments. The UK and the 
European Union, however, called for stronger formal standards.xxi
 In 1999 BCBS proposed that a new accord was required to increase ‘competitive 
equality’ among internationally active banks, particularly as US banks – who were most heavily 
engaged in disintermediation – were able to have more capital at work than was reflected in their 
official capital adequacy ratios.xxii In addition to the credit risks (prospect of default) on traditional 
banking loans, the new accord would tackle market risks (from changes in interest and exchange 
rates, and equity and commodity prices) and, importantly, operational risks (‘the risk of direct or 
indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems, or from 
external events’).xxiii The key obstacle for the new accord was to reconcile a standardised method 
among all banks with sufficient leeway in internal risk assessment. Given the continuation of 
national and regional divergence in banking systems, the BCBS’s task was particularly arduous.   
In June 2004 the BCBS released the ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards’ framework, commonly referred to as ‘Basle II’. The new accord is built 
upon three pillars. Pillar I states that banks must hold at least eight percent of ‘regulatory capital’ 
(their capital adequacy) in relation to their risk weighted assets. Pillar II sets supervisory standards 
within banks. Pillar III emphasizes public disclosure of a bank’s financial position to allow market 
forces to discipline institutions.  
Most of the recent attention and debate has focused on the standardized approach within 
Pillar I’s risk weightings. Here risk is assessed by BIS internal assessment and by credit rating 
agencies (CRAs), with ‘AAA’ ratings receiving 20 percent, with scales of 50 and 100 percent on A 
grade variations until ‘B’ ratings receive a weighting of 150 percent of committed capital. So, to 
take an example, if a bank lent $1 million to a prominent multinational corporation with a rating of 
‘AAA’ it would have to put aside $16,000, while if it lent the same amount to a company in a 
developing country with a ‘B’ rating it would need to put aside $120,000. Understandably, the 
accord is criticized for being viciously biased against developing countries, as well as for its 
reliance on ‘impartial’ CRAs.xxiv
Basle II also provides an ‘internal rating-based’ (IRB) approach as an alternative to the 
Pillar I standardized approach. Here, the bank is required to assess each borrower’s creditworthiness 
(the ‘KYC’ – ‘know your customer’ – approach) to predict future losses and then use regulatory 
benchmarks or historical records of loss on loans as a risk weighting.xxv Basle II compliance 
therefore requires banks not already up to speed to invest heavily in staff and technology to improve 
customer creditworthiness assessment. 
As a consequence, US regulators and banks complain that the new accord imposes unnecessary 
costs on some of their most competitive of financial instruments and financial institutions, such as 
asset-backed securities held by small to medium banks (95 percent of US banks are in this 
category).xxvi The biggest losers from the accord, however, are developing countries who have little 
capacity to provide the monitoring infrastructure to reduce risk weightings for themselves and their 
clients.xxvii
 
4.  Networks for Micro- and Macro-Prudential Regulation 
From the mid-1990s onwards the BIS has asserted the need for micro- and macro-prudential 
regulation within the global financial order.xxviii Here micro-prudential regulation includes 
knowledge and information sharing among banking and securities regulators, as well as the creation 
of clear management standards. Macro-prudential regulation includes similar activities among 
international economic institutions, both public and private. 
The BIS has a good track record of encouraging the development of institutional networks 
among international economic institutions.  In 1992 it assisted in the creation of the ‘Joint Vienna 
Institute’ alongside the IMF, the European Community, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the World Bank, and the OECD. This institute sought to provide technical assistance 
to Central and Eastern European countries and the newly independent former Soviet republics 
following the collapse of the Soviet System. It also provided an opportunity for the BIS to establish 
data-sharing relationships with the major international economic institutions.  Following the Asian 
and Russian financial crises of 1997-8 (which it successfully predicted),xxix the BIS hosted a 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to bring together central bank officials, national financial 
regulators, and representatives from the IMF, among others. Importantly, the FSF dramatically 
expanded the number of countries involved in discussions, with potentially greater voice for the 
Group of Twenty (G-20),xxx and also increased the range of topics on the table, including, for 
example, the regulation of hedge funds and offshore financial centres.xxxi In 1999 the BIS also set 
up the Financial Stability Institute to promote common standards in financial regulatory standards 
and as a ‘one stop shop’ for regulators to learn about new market instruments and techniques. In 
addition, since 1999 the BIS, IMF, World Bank, and OECD have published creditor-based 
measures of developing and transition countries’ external debt.xxxii All of these activities are 
designed to thicken the information networks among international economic institutions with the 
desire of creating a common standard. 
One interesting aspect of the BIS are its efforts to support regionalization. While many other 
international economic institutions are criticized for policy homogeneity that cannot account for 
regional differences (particularly criticisms waged against the IMF), the BIS has actively sought to 
create regional offices and build relationships with central banks and regional associations that are 
inclusive rather than exclusive. This also occurs at a time when new shareholding member central 
banks are from Central Europe, East Asia, and the Western Hemisphere.xxxiii During the past 15 
years the BIS has maintained a consistent presence at regional associations in an advisory role.xxxiv 
From these earlier connections, the BIS opened up an Asian regional representative office in Hong 
Kong in July 1998, and an American representative office in Mexico City. Furthermore, in July 
2003 the BIS took over the management of a $1 billion Asian Bond Fund (ABF) created by 
EMEAP (Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks).xxxv  
In addition to encouraging macro-prudential regulations through regional and international 
forums, as well as involving CRAs in monitoring, the BIS places great emphasis on the capacity to 
influence central bankers’ ideas and interests through the forging of close personal networks. As 
such, the BIS actively cultivates what Timothy J. Sinclair has recently termed ‘Embedded 
Knowledge Networks’.xxxvi  The BIS has explicitly sought to foster a ‘culture of risk management’ 
among central bankers that can reduce procyclical ‘overlending’.xxxvii The BIS also stresses the 
importance of training central bank officials, and others, to read and interpret financial data. From 
the BIS’s viewpoint, frequent meetings and the establishment of common frames for understanding 
are more likely to produce ‘symmetrical regulatory policy’ that not only better financial and 
monetary regulation but also stronger commitments to publicly defending inflation and deficit 
targets. The question here, of course, is whether those attending these meetings are responsible to 
the BIS as shareholders in the institution, or to their own governments and people.xxxviii  
 
Last Words 
For a 75 year old IT guy, the BIS is quite sprightly. The BIS has a special place within the global 
political economy as the key financial regulator but also as an institution that is a limited liability 
company with no formal capacity to enforce the standards it generates.xxxix Instead, the BIS relies on 
its capacity to gather and share information, to convince central banks of their best interests at a 
collective and individual level, and to, after all, represent its shareholders. Given these attributes it 
is perhaps surprising that the bulk of work on this international quango has stressed how it is 
conveniently used by Great Powers out of their self-interested desire to overcome collective action 
problems.xl As the institution has no formal enforcement powers to ‘lock in’ member central banks, 
one of its key tasks is to shape and transform central bankers’ and prudential regulators’ ideas and 
therefore self-interests.xli  So far the BIS appears to have succeeded in doing so. While strategic 
action and financial innovations provide central and commercial banks some room to move, it is 
difficult to defy a web of rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that has become so deeply 
ingrained.xlii Basle II provides a good example here of how the IT guy’s maintenance of networks 
and structures places great pressure on his bosses to follow rather than buck the system. In early 
2003 US regulators were wavering in their willingness to agree to Basle II and even post-
agreement, in September 2005, the Federal Reserve announced that US financial regulators would 
delay the accords implementation until 2008.xliii Nonetheless, the US intends to implement the 
accord. 
Finally, while shared ideas and self-interests among friends may all be good and well, there 
is a growing legitimacy gap between the prudential financial regulation being devised by the BIS 
and BCBS, and what can actually be implemented. Basle II is likely to place a hefty premium on 
most developing countries’ financial activities and will not necessarily increase financial stability. 
This problem is particularly troublesome given the amount of capital required for providing the 
technical infrastructure to meet Basle II standards.xliv As a consequence, developing countries face 
both internal and external constraints on the amount of capital they can access. The drive among 
international economic institutions, both public and private, to improve their arm’s length capacity 
to assess the creditworthiness of developing countries is one key feature of this current period of 
financial globalization.xlv While this aim is undoubtedly superior to the ‘gunboat diplomacy’ of the 
last period of financial globalization it does not stop critically important questions concerning the 
legitimacy of our global financial order.xlvi  
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